15. The Government Suárez

The King were felt less and less satisfied with Arias by their/its/your/his disability to react against the strengthening of the left otherwise that it would not be with the repression and the violence. 9 of June the Courts approved a new law of political associations, but refused to modify the penal code, what would have permitted to legalize to the political parties, such as anticipated the new law. Unable to negotiating with the búnker, and unable to negotiating with the opposition, Arias resigned 1 of July.

In spite that were waited, as a rule, that is formed a government headed by Areilza, Juan Carlos named to Adolfo Suárez for the president cargo of the Ministers Council. The principal advantage of Suárez were that, as ancient secretary of the Movement, would be capable, guided by Fernández Miranda, of using to the system against itself.

The advantage, with all, it was not resulting evident by mid 1976. The credentials falangistas of Suárez horrified to the opposition, therefore in the second July week were summoned massive demonstrations in favor of the political freedoms and of the amnesty. The success of these did not let doubt in Adolfo Suárez of the fact that was necessary a rapid and complete reform if were wanted to solve the crisis without violence.

In effect, with a government formed by elements bound to the most progressive sectors of the Spanish capitalism, Suárez decided quickly to establish plans for a deepest democratization. A dynamic press and polemics was converted enseguida in the stage for the discussions on the political reform. Suárez it were faced to a difficult situation: on the one hand, they were the búnker and the army; by the other, an opposition that was conceiving the break covenanted in negotiation terms with the Government, in order to arrive to an agreement to form a provisional government type Agreement of San Sebastián (*), that prepared free elections to form some constituent Courts.

Pulley, in particular, was maintaining their/its/your/his pressure by means of a calculated policy intended for to draw to the light from new to the PCE, challenging to the Government to the fact that tolerated the existence of the Party or well revealed their/its/your/his real sampling returning to the restrictive methods. After a meeting of the Central Committee of the PCE, celebrated openly in Rome around the end of July, the Party began (in autumn) to distribute season-tickets. Then Pulley informed Suárez, through intermediary, that if it was not obtaining a passport, would celebrate a press conference in Madrid in presence of Oriana Fallaci, Marcel Niedergang and influential other journalists.

estaba developing thus a real struggle among Suárez and the opposition by the control of the transition process. As pretext to delay it, Suárez could always to make mention of the soldiers; as incentive to accelerate it, the opposition could threaten with an increase in the pressure of the popular bulks. Suárez could so only to take the initiative if was capable of combining important grants with their/its efforts to divide to the united front of the opposition.

High-priority objective was cause that the communists let of dialing the pace of the recoveries of the opposition and are located in a most defensive state to attempt to avoid their/its/your/his isolation. To what is long of the month of August Suárez was interviewed with a wide range of personalities of the opposition, included Felipe González, to who made a favorable impression. It was maintained also in touch with Pulley through José Armourer Mario and urged to the leader of the PCE to the fact that it did not make impossible the transition.

Suárez it were found in the sluggish cord. Any reform there was of drawing to the soldiers and to the establishment franquista, but the pressure were exercised on Suárez. 4 of September, a wide fan of liberal groups, socialdemócratas and Christian Democratic, were gathered in Madrid, in the Eurobuilding, to discuss with Democratic Coordination and other regional opposition fronts a series of problems related to the elaboration of a common strategy.

All what left of the meeting was the creation of link committees, but this was not sufficing to compel to Suárez to accelerate the preparations for the presentation of their/its/your/his political reform project. Was not of missing that there is constant rumors suddenly of military state. Nothing shows better the notables cuali - dades of Suárez for the political maneuver that the skill with the one which assured the consent of the army with respect to their/its plans. 8 of September presented the project before a group of high graduation officers and you/them requested their/its/your/his patriotic support. Suárez was enjoying support Juan Carlos, therefore their/its plans were accepted by the soldiers, though with reticences, these were insisting in which the PCE had to be excluded of any future reform. Suárez it would not maintain their/its/your/his promise and this would lead to the fact that the hostility of the soldiers against him would be in increase.

For the moment, the first notice was the resignation of the par vice-president Matters of the Defense, general Fernando Santiago and Díaz of Mendívil, that declared that - " the Government prepares an arrangement, possibly with the decree range - law, to which have opposed me unfruitfully, for which is authorized the union freedom, what supposes, to my judgement, the authorization of the central union CNT, UGT and FAI, responsible for the assignment misbehaviors in red field, and of the CC.OO., union organization of the Communist Party " -. The resignation provoked solidarity statements on the part of military others, happiness expressions in the press of the búnker and the appointment of the liberal general Manuel Gutiérrez Nicked to substitute to this. The esperanzas put by the búnker in a coup d'état remained defrauded.

10 of September, Suárez presented the reform project al country. Since had been their/its/your/his government the one which had proposed to celebrate elections before by mid 1977, and since it would not make mention for nothing of their/its/your/his resignation and the training of a provisional government, the PCE denounced the project, to which qualified as defraudation antidemocrático. However, other groups of the opposition had been seen pleasantly sorpren - didos for the extent of the democratization of the daily life, therefore was seeming to collect body the promises of Suárez. The prey was operating normally, it political groups to the right of the PCE did not had impediments, the PSOE was preparing their/its/your/his XXVII Congress, and even to the PCE was permitted to him/her/you, unofficially, that is occupied of their/its matters within Spanish territory.

The initiative was happening to hands of Suárez. This could insinuate to the socialists and to the democristia - us that would be able to do even greater grants, as long as is not agitated too the ship and is not provoked to the soldiers insisting on a premature authorization of the PCE. With their/its/your/his typical ability and trickery, Suárez was trying to using the matter to insert a cradle among the groups of the opposition and, at the same time, to impose prudence to Pulley. Faced to the evident impossibility of imposing changes against the will of the soldiers and to the considerable signs of the fact that the things were marching deprisa and well with Suárez, the opposition did not be able to do other coas more than be certified.

In effect, with the aid of Torcuato Fenández Miranda, Suárez esta having a great success in leading their/its/your/his reform project by among the institutions franquistas. 8 of October, in an atmosphere something tense, their/its/your/his project was approved, with some amendment without importance, by the National Council by eighty votes against thirteen and six abstentions. By mid November, when the project was discussed in the Courts, there were able deployments of sofisterías, being used all the panoply of the political theories franquistas, by both decrees: Blas Piñar assumed the defense of the búnker and Michael cousin of Rivera that of reform project. The previous maneuvers behind the scenes of Suárez and Fernández Miranda produced their/its fruits, since the reform was approved by 425 votes, against 59 and 13 abstentions. Was a collective suicide, due, probably, to the habit of the obedience as well as to an overdone sense of the patriotism. To be the institutions franquista already in witting liquidation, the road was remaining prompt for the celebration of the elections. Suárez had had fully reason upon relying in which the opposition would have accepted their/its/your/his version of a reform granted from up.

The opposition stayed in an attitude recelosa, what was understandable after the useless reform attempts of those which had been witness with Solís, White Teamster and Arias Navarro. 23 of October, Democratic Coordination had been united to five regional fronts, of Valencia, Catalonia, Balearic, Canarias and Galicia, to form the Democratic Organizations Platform. To be known that Suárez was thinking to summon a referendum, the Platform had threatened with boycotting it. However, now was Suárez who was dialing the tone, and was beed making way the idea of the fact that there would be a notables committee of the opposition to negotiate with the Government. The wave of strikes was losing push and, weigh to the call of the opposition in favor of the abstention, the referendum of the 15 of December saw as were approved the project by 94 for 100 of the votes. For these dates the PSOE was already prepared to accepting that Suárez was capable of finishing with the franquismo. In their/its/your/his XXVII Congress, the socialists decided to participate in the elections, though they might not have been legalized still all the parties.